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Human Heart Transplantation 
Theologi~al Observations 
John J. Lynch, S.J. 
This article is reprinted with 
permission from AMERICA The 
National Catholic Weekly Review, 106 
W. 56 Street, New York, N.Y., 10019; 
. C 1968 America Press, Inc. 
Certainly the most dramatic surgical 
event of 1967 was the performance in 
early December of the first 
transplantation of a human heart from 
a cadaver into the living body of a 
second person. The medical outcome 
of that history-making operation, and 
of the four others like it which 
followed in relatively quick succession, 
is common enough knowledge to 
forbid repetition here. Moreover, any 
appraisal of the surgical future of such 
procedures is rightfully reserved to 
medical experts. But since much of the 
world at large is also currently 
concerned about the moral 
implications of the matter - man's 
dominion versus God's dominion with 
respect to human life ; human 
providence versus divine Providence 
with respect to death - the following 
comments from a theolo.gical 
viewpoint may not be amiss. 
It should be understood, however, 
that this discussion is not designed to 
pass judgment on the morality of any 
of the heart transplants which have 
already been performed. That would 
be a presumptuous undertaking for 
any theologian at present, since 
neither authentic medical records nor 
other relevant data are available to 
serve as basis for sound moral 
conclusions. For present purposes it 
will suffice to consider transplantation 
of the human heart in the absl ~ t -
as though no instance of it he. ~ver 
yet occurred - and to t. to 
determine whether and whe the 
procedure could be approv as 
morally unobjectionable. 
It is to be understood also t} the 
comments to follow are inten J to 
apply only to medical situati ·; in 
which transplantation of a ,nan 
heart ( 1) is a necessary measure last 
resort, (2) offers reasonable h\ e of 
substantial benefit to the rec. ent, 
and (3) is performed by an op{ :ting 
team medically and sur ;ally 
competent to carry out this ki ~ of 
procedure. Although no conscit. ious 
surgeon needs to be reminde( that 
these three provisos are · all 1 the 
sine-qua-non variety, it is none: eless 
advisable that, when discussir the 
question of heart transplant ' the 
theologian express himself explic. ly in 
this regard lest he be misunderst Jd as 
endorsing irresponsible s~ •gical 
experimentation. 
Just a word in further expla; :ttion 
of these presuppositions. 
1) A necessary measure o... last 
resort. This precaution implies tt~J t the 
patient's condition is so critical_ that 
sound medical opinion would judge 
him to be here and now in grave and 
relatively proximate danger of death. 
It further implies that no less drastic 
(Father Lynch is Professor of !vforal 
Theology at Weston . College in 
Massachusetts.) 
--~L _ __ 12~---------------------------------~L~m~a~cr~e~Q~u~~~te~r~lY~--· 
treatment is likely to be effective in 
the prolongation of the pa~ient's life . 
Perhaps as the technique of 
transplanting hearts is gradually 
perfected, surgical prognosis will so 
improve as to allow for some 
mitigation of this restriction. But as 
yet the operation is still in the 
experimental stage and beyond 
question entails hazards of a very 
serious kind. Hence the procedure 
should as yet be considered one of last 
resort. 
2) Reasonable hope of substantial 
benefit to the recipient. Reasonable 
hope is by no means to be interpreted 
as a guarantee , but merely as a 
well-founded medical expectation. 
Substantial benefit is to be understood 
principally in terms of prolongation of 
human life over a period of time 
sufficiently protracted to compensate 
for the risks presently. entailed in 
human heart transplantation. Only 
competent medical authority can 
judge whether and when this condition 
is fulfilled . But unless it can be 
honestly judged to be fulfilled , 
recourse to heart transplantation 
would represent a form of human 
experimentation which could not find 
moral justification 
3) Medical and surgical competence 
of the operating team This stipulation 
is self~xplanatory and requires no 
defense of its inclusion in this context. 
It implies that each participating 
member of the operating team has 
been, both in theory and in practice 
(at least by virtue of sufficient animal 
experimentation) adequately rehearsed 
for his part in the total proce.dure. 
On the understanding, therefore , 
that human heart transplantation 
would be undertaken only in medical 
circumstances such as those just 
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specified, what remains to be said 
about the morality of the procedu~? 
First, it may be helpful to point out 
that , theologically speaking , 
transplantation of any organ from a 
human corpse presents a far less 
complicated problem than does an 
organ transplant from a living donor. 
For more than a generation, 
theologians have disagreed as to the 
licitness of the latter procedure. Some 
maintain that bodily mutilation - the 
excision of a living person's kidney, 
for example - can be morally justified 
only if it is necessary for the total well 
being of that same person, as would be 
the case if malignancy should be 
discovered in the kidney and 
nephrectomy therefore deemed 
necessary in orde.- to save the victim's 
life. But to sacrifice a healthy kidney 
for the benefit of another · is 
considered by this school of thought 
to be in excess of man's right to 
dispose of his bodily members. 
Other theologians, however - and 
they are most probably in the majority 
- find justification for this species of 
transplantation in the law of fraternal 
love which permits one to do for 
another whatever one may legitimately 
do for himself. This more benign 
opinion is theologically most 
respectable and may be safely 
followed in practice under certain 
conditions which need not be discussed 
in present context. 
This problem of donor mutilation, 
however, does not arise when organs 
are removed from cadavera for 
purposes of transplantation. Clearly a 
corpse is no longer a person possessed · 
of human rights or subject to human 
obligations; and although we are not 
entirely free to dispose of human . 
remains at will, we are considerably 
less restricted in our rightful 
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disposition of inanimate bodies than 
would be the case with the bodily 
members of the living. It remains. to be 
seen, therefore, what these lesser 
restrictions may be. 
The first proviso relates to the 
prospective recipient of the heart 
transplant, and stipulates that his 
informed consent to the procedure be 
previously obtained. The reason for 
insisting upon the observance of this 
condition is the fact that' 
transplantation of a human heart 
unquestionably represents at present 
an instance of extraordinary means of 
prolonging life. As a very general rule 
extraordinary medical measures are 
not of obligation for the patient, who 
is still within his God-given rights if he 
chooses to decline treatment so 
uncertain and hazardous and to allow 
nature to take its lethal course. Since 
it is the patient's prerogative to decide 
whether extraordinary means are to be 
employed or disregarded, this right 
should be most carefully respected. 
Consequently it would be the doctor's 
responsibility to explain to his patient 
as objectively as possible the medical 
pros and cons of the procedure and 
thereafter to abide by the patient's 
subsequent decision. 
Secondly, consent should also be 
obtained either from the d~nor 
before death or, after his demise, from 
someone - usually next of kin -
authorized to make such a decision. 
Although doubtlessly there would be 
instances in which consent could be 
reasonably presumed, explicit 
permission, if it can be requested, is by 
far the preferable alternative. 
Finally, the heart is not to be 
removed from the donor's body until 
there is moral certitude that medical 
death has occurred. 
4 
Real medical death may be def ~ d 
as cessation of vital function bev 1d 
reasonable hope of resuscitation ~ ut 
it is for doctors, not theologian ~ to 
determine the discernible signs )y 
which real death can be verifie in 
concrete circumstances~ Wit' ut 
presuming to trespass on me ;al 
preserves, one might venture he 
surmise that theologians gene ;Jy 
would perhaps be willing to accep o; a 
working criterion of medical deat1 he 
provisions of South African la' to 
which Dr. Christiaan Barnard all ied 
during his year-end interview o BS 
Television, viz., simultaneous la1 of 
reflexes, respiration, and heart-be If 
a more precise standard of pra cal 
judgment is reasonably availab it 
should, of course, be used. 
Under no circumstances, even the 
prospective donor is certainly do· ned 
to die within a very short time. nay 
the doctor anticipate death and ~ gin 
removing the heart from a ·1ing 
human subject. This statement d ives 
from a theological view of an's 
dominion over human life whil up 
until very recently had ·)een 
unanimously accepted and taug' t by 
Catholic theologians as part o the 
Church's moral doctrine. It ts a 
theological view which depends .1pon 
an essential distinction betwee1; the 
moral obligation not to kill an J the 
moral obligation to keep alive. Only 
the former is absolute. In accof'iance 
with it, direct killing of an inno.cent 
human being, even if otherwise already 
doomed to die, still remains murder. 
And just as killing out of mercy to the 
patient would always be wrong, so too 
killing to obtain a transplant (mercy to 
another) would always be wrong. 
Whatever, then, may be the acceptable 
indications of medical death, these 
must be verified before one could 
Linacre QuarterlY 
allow the removal of an organ so 
essential to life that its excision would · 
amount to a direct killing. 
Technical control over the beginning 
and ending of human life is ever 
increasing and is bound to raise a great 
variety of questions with regard to 
man's dominion over his members, his 
functions , and his very being. The 
solution of these questions will depend 
to a great extent on one's theological 
convictions as to the sacred 
inviolability of human life. Is human 
life especially sacred, not merely 
because of the essential dignity of a 
human "personality ," but becau se 
human life is itself removed from 
'man's dominion and reserved to God's 
own providence? If so , to what extent 
is control of human life exclusively of 
divine right? 
Not enough · time has elapsed to 
allow for thorough · theological 
discussion of the heart transplant. But 
it does not seem likely that any serious 
moral objection will be lodged against 
the procedure as long as the above 
cautions are observed. 
Marquette Medical School 
Severs Ties with University 
All legal ties between Marquette University and its medical 
school were severed at a special meeting on September 30. The 
newly reorganized school has been named the Marquette School 
of Medicine , Inc. The reorganization is intended to remove any 
obstacles to participation of the school in a medical center for 
southeastern Wisconsin, in which the school and Milwaukee 
County General Hospital would be the nucleus. 
Both Very Rev. John P. Raynor, S.J., University president, and 
Father Raymond R. McAuley, S.J., executive vice president , have 
resigned from the medical school's board of directors. In the past, 
the president of the University was also president and chairman 
of the medical school corporation. Under the newly amended 
incorporation articles, no University officers automatically will be 
oa the board. 
Louis Quarles, a senior partner in the legal firm of Quarles, 
Herriot, Clemons, Teschner and Noelke , has been elected 
president of the reorganized board to succeed Father Raynor. 
John W. Cowee, who had been on the board because of his 
position as vice president of business and finance, has been 
elected to the board as a public member. He also was elected vice 
president of the reorganized board. He had been its secretary. 
Cowee remains vice president of what now is Marquette School of 
Medicine, Inc. 
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